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Abstract 
This paper compiles a novel dataset of time-varying measures of government consumption cyclicality for a 
panel of 46 African economies between 1960 and 2014. Government consumption has, generally, been 
highly procyclical over time in this group of countries. However, sample averages hide serious heterogeneity 
across countries with the majority of them showing procyclical behavior despite some positive signs of 
graduation from the “procyclicality trap” in a few cases. By means of weighted least squares regressions, 
we find that more developed African economies tend to have a smaller degree of government consumption 
procyclicality. Countries with higher social fragmentation and those are more reliant on foreign aid inflows 
tend to have a more procyclical government consumption policy. Better governance promotes counter-
cyclical fiscal policy whileincreased democracy dampens it. Finally, some fiscal rules are important in 
curbing the procyclical behavior of government consumption.  
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1. Introduction  
The Global Financial Crisis and its legacies have put fiscal policy at the center of the debate 
about the policy mix required to help steering economies towards a stable growth path. In addition 
to the allocation and distribution roles, fiscal policy is also responsible for the macroeconomic 
stabilization against business cycle fluctuations (Musgrave, 1959). Pressing policy challenges have 
revived the debate on the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilizer (van der Ploeg, 2005; Botman 
et al., 2006).1 A growing number of countries have turned to fiscal policy as their primary 
stabilization tool either because of changes in their monetary regime  or because financial 
conditions deteriorated to the point of making monetary policy ineffective (Spilimbergo et al., 
2008). As economic conditions normalize, policymakers expect to rely on fiscal stabilizers to 
prevent short-term setbacks and dampen any future volatility, which in turn is known to negatively 
affect medium-term growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995).2  
Against this background, understanding how government expenditure fluctuates with 
business conditions is extremely relevant from a policy making perspective. Expenditure patterns 
may change due to policy makers’ discretionary actions (even though the majority of the empirical 
literature suggests a pro-cyclical bias of these measures - van den Noord, 2000) or as a result of the 
operation of automatic stabilizers (by lessening the effects of the liquidity constraints faced by 
households and alleviating the impact of exogenous shocks on aggregate current consumption and 
output - Granado et al., 2013). Government spending has a stabilizing effect if it increases when 
output growth rises and falls when output growth declines (Furceri, 2010).3 The more 
countercyclical government spending is, the higher its stabilizing effect.  
Most of the empirical literature looking at the cyclical properties of government expenditure 
typically uncover i) an acyclical or countercyclical behavior in advanced countries (see e.g. 
Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002); and ii) a procyclical pattern in developing countries (Gavin et al., 
1996; Kaminsky et al., 2004; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). A number of explanations have been 
advanced to justify the different cyclical patterns in different groups of countries (see section 2 for 
more details). Moreover, most empirical studies on this topic can be split in two: i) those that 
document the cyclical properties of fiscal policy and/or its components; and ii) those that inspect 
their determinants. The overwhelming majority of papers has focused (due to data-related issues) 
on empirical analyses of European or OECD countries, with a few exceptions (see e.g. Thornton 
(2008) for African countries, which serves as the key reference for this paper). 
 
1 This stabilization goal can be thought of as a “residual” since it is only a byproduct of choices concerning the size, 
the structure and the way government is financed which are dictated either by efficiency or distributive considerations. 
2 The argument relates to skill losses due to unemployment in recessions with negative effects on productivity and 
medium-term growth (Martin and Rogers, 1997); a second argument rests on the observation that growth is usually 
low in periods of political instability (Alesina et al., 1992); a third one relates to credit market imperfections (Stiglitz, 
1994); the most common argument stresses the importance of uncertainty in investment decisions (Dixit and Pyndic, 
1994). 
3 Fiscal stabilizers reduce output fluctuations because some components of fiscal accounts react automatically to the 
business cycle, increasing public deficits in recessions and decreasing them in expansions.  
(continued) 
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In this paper we ask two main questions. First, how stabilizing is de facto government’s 
consumption in African countries and how has its cyclicality varied over time, between countries 
and around business cycles’ turning points? Second, which macroeconomic, financial, institutional 
and political variables determine the degree of cyclicality of government consumption in this group 
of African countries? We make a positive contribution to the debate and we answer the two research 
questions using a novel empirical strategy. Specifically, we estimate time-varying measures of 
government consumption cyclicality for a panel of 46 African countries between 1960 and 2014.4 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that estimates time-varying measures of 
government consumption cyclicality for a large set of African economies.5 In addition, we examine 
which are the most relevant determinants of the time-varying measures of government spending 
cyclicality. The use of time-varying measures of government spending cyclicality overcomes the 
key limitation of previous studies assessing the drivers of fiscal cyclicality that rely on cross-
country regressions and, therefore, are not able to account for country-specific as well as global 
factors. 
We find that government consumption has been highly procyclical over time in our sample 
of African countries. However, sample averages hide serious heterogeneity across countries: while 
the majority show a procyclical behavior, there are some that display positive signs of graduation 
from procyclicality. By means of weighted least squares regressions, we find that more developed 
African economies tend to be less procyclical. Also, countries with higher social fragmentation and 
those more reliant on foreign aid inflows have a more procyclical government spending policy. 
Better governance promotes counter-cyclical fiscal policy whileincreased democracy dampens it. 
Finally, some fiscal rules are important in curbing the procyclical behavior of government 
spending. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature. 
Section 3 outlines the methodological framework and discusses the data. Section 4 presents some 
stylized facts on the estimated cyclicality coefficients. Section 5 discusses the main empirical 
results on the factors explaining cross-country differences in cyclicality coefficients. The last 
section concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
 Most discussions on the cyclicality patterns of fiscal policy are centred around two main 
theories: the Keynesian approach and the Neoclassical tax-smoothing model (Barro, 1979). The 
Keynesians posit that governments should spend and tax countercyclically, i.e., boosting demand 
through increased spending or lowering taxes during a recession and doing the opposite during 
booms (Prasad and Gerecke, 2010). In contrast, Barro’s tax-smoothing model recommends an 
 
4 The selection of countries was based on the criteria of having at least 20 continuous time-series observations of 
government consumption so as to be able to properly estimate time-varying coefficient models. 
5 Thornton (2008) relied on a sample of 37 African countries between 1960-2004 and carried out a static cross-
country empirical analysis. 
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acyclical fiscal policy that helps keeping government expenditure and tax constant regardless of 
output fluctuations. 
 As far as expenditure policy is concerned, in order to stabilize the economy, governments 
should increase public spending during a downturn and vice versa. This would be a desirable 
feature from a fiscal stabilization point of view - and indeed a characteristic of most Advanced 
Economies (Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Staehr, 2008; Egert, 2012). However, Gavin et al. (1996)6 called 
the attention to the procyclical nature of expenditure policy in many developing countries 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008; Diallo, 
2009; Abdih et al., 2010). That is, we observed in several developing countries spending indicators 
comoving positively with the business cycle, a behaviour that exacerbates booms and aggravates 
busts. This procyclical pattern was particularly evident in periods of financial distress (Real and 
Vicente, 2008; Vegh and Vuletin, 2012). 7 Recently, Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2013) argued that, 
over the course of the last decade, roughly one third of the developing world could escape the 
procyclicality trap and engage in countercyclical fiscal policy. 
 A number of explanations has been put forward to justify differentiated cyclical fiscal patterns 
in different groups of countries. Inadequate access to international credit markets and lack of 
financial depth (Gavin et al., 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008) 
as well as political distortions and weak institutions (Tornell and Lane, 19998; Alesina et al., 2008; 
Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Fatas and Mihov 2013; Abbott, Cabral, Jones, 
Palacios, 2015) were the two main reasons behind the procyclical expenditure behavior in 
developing countries. The first argument related to the limited access to the international financial 
market as credit rationing imposed by investors (especially during economic downturns) limits 
governments´ ability to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy. The second reason was built around 
the perception that political issues and weak institutions were prime contributors to procyclical 
fiscal policies (Alesina et al., 2008). 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
Our empirical strategy has two stages (following Lane (1998) and Woo (2005)). First, we 
estimate country-specific coefficients of government consumption cyclicality. Once these 
coefficients are estimated, we inspect in a second stage, their main determinants based on variables 
found in the literature to affect fiscal cyclicality. This two-stage strategy will be conducted twice: 
once using a static approach and once using a dynamic approach.  
 
6 These authors were the first to notice the procyclical phenomenon in Latin American countries which differed 
substantially from the one observed in OECD countries. 
7 Emerging markets have a high reliance on external debt to finance government expenditure (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2011) and face countercyclical interest rates(see Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006)). 
8 Tornell and Lane´s (1999) framework highlighted different political blocs competing for a share of fiscal revenues. 
They argued that competition among these fiscal blocs increased during booms. This approach resulted in increased 
government expenditure as compared to increased general income – an effect known as voracity. 
(continued) 
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To empirically estimate the degree of cyclicality of fiscal policy, we consider as the key 
variable of interest the log of real government consumption (G). This is the same approach taken 
by Thornton (2008) which can be justified as follows. First, in analyzing the stance of fiscal policy, 
public investment should be excluded from governments´ fiscal constraints (Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2004), Buiter and Grafe (2004) and Fatás (2005)).9 Second, expressing government 
consumption as a share of GDP could lead to erroneous conclusions if the cyclicality effect ends 
up being dominated by that coming from the denominator (Kaminsky et al., 2004). As mentioned 
in the introduction, a procyclical fiscal policy is one in which government consumption increases 
in good times and decreases in bad times. Econometrically, we are interested in first estimating for 
each country i the coefficient 𝛽 in the following equation: 
 ∆ log(𝐺௧) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ ∆ log(𝑌௧) + 𝛾 ∙ ∆ log(𝐺௧ିଵ) + 𝜀௧   (1) 
where ∆ is the annual change in a given variable (with 𝑡 in years),  𝑌௧ is real GDP. 𝛽 captures the 
degree of government cyclicality. A 𝛽>0 implies a procyclical fiscal policy (with values of 𝛽 above 
one corresponding to a more-than-proportionate response of government consumption to a change 
in real GDP), with the reverse being true for 𝛽<0. The lagged government consumption variable is 
included to allow for long-term mean-reversion, a feature consistent with fiscal sustainability in 
adherence to the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and the need to avoid Ponzi 
schemes. 𝜀 is a white noise disturbance satisfying usual assumptions of zero mean and constant 
variance. 
We then assess how government consumption cyclicality coefficients have changed over 
time in each country by taking a model that generalizes the linear regression model (given by 
equation 1) and introducing the assumption that regression coefficients may vary over time. We 
take equation (1) and rewrite it with time-varying parameters, as follows: 
 
 ∆ log(𝐺௧) = 𝛼௧ + 𝛽௧ ∙ ∆ log(𝑌௧) + 𝛾௧ ∙ ∆ log(𝐺௧ିଵ) + 𝜀௧   (2) 
The coefficient of interest 𝛽 is assumed to change slowly and unsystematically over time 
and its conditional expected value today is equal to yesterday’s value. The change of the coefficient 
𝛽 is denoted by 𝑣௜,௧, which is assumed to be normally distributed with expectation zero and variance 
𝜎௜ଶ: 
 𝛽௧ = 𝛽௧ିଵ + 𝑣௧  (3) 
 
 
9 Government investment is perceived as being very different from current consumption expenditures. First, investment 
decisions have a multi-year horizon, so the reaction to the business cycle might not be contemporaneous and might 
potentially affect government budgets over several years. Second, the benefits resulting from public investment are 
spread over many years and generations (raising issues of intergenerational justice and fairness which are outside this 
paper´s purpose). This paper also does not distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary components of 
government consumption (which can be the object of future research), because what really matters for our analysis is 
the aggregate response of government consumption to the cycle. We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
(continued) 
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Equations (2) and (3) are jointly estimated using the Varying-Coefficient model proposed 
by Schlicht (1985). In this approach, variances 𝜎௜ଶ are calculated by a method-of-moments 
estimator that coincides with the maximum-likelihood estimator for large samples (see Schlicht, 
1985; Schlicht, 2003; Schlicht and Ludsteck, 2006 for details).10 The model described in equations 
(2) and (3) generalizes equation (1), which is obtained as a special case when the variance of the 
disturbances approaches zero. As discussed by Aghion and Marinescu (2008), this method has 
several advantages compared to other approaches used to compute time-varying coefficients (such 
as rolling windows and Gaussian methods). First, it allows using all observations in the sample to 
estimate the government´s consumption cyclicality coefficient in each year—which is not possible 
in the rolling windows approach. Second, changes in the cyclicality coefficient in a given year 
come from innovations in that same year, rather than from shocks occurring in neighboring years. 
Third, it reflects the fact that changes in policy are slow and depend on the immediate past. Fourth, 
it reduces reverse causality problems when time-varying cyclicality coefficients are used as 
explanatory variable as they depend on its own past. In addition to statistical superiority, the use of 
this time-varying technique allows one to better map annual changes in cyclicality with good and 
bad times of the economic activity for a given country-time pair.11  
In our second stage, we empirically assess the importance of various macroeconomic, 
structural and institutional factors in affecting the degree of government spending cyclicality. To 
formally test the importance of different factors that may explain the cross-country variation in 
government consumption cyclicality, we estimate the following specification: 
 
 𝛽መ௜௧ = 𝛿௜ + 𝛾௧ + 𝜽′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜖௜௧ (4) 
 
where 𝛽መ௜௧ are the static or time-varying coefficient estimates obtained from equations (1) or (2), 
respectively. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of time-varying macroeconomic, structural and institutional variables 
(to reduce reverse causality, explanatory variables are lagged by one year).12 𝛿௜ are country effects, 
to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and time-unvarying factors such as 
geographical variables. 𝛾௧ are time effects to control for global shocks such as the global business 
cycle or oil shocks. We first estimate equation (4) with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) using both 
static (making equation (4) effectively a cross-sectional equation capturing average effects between 
1960 and 2014) and time-varying coefficient (TVC) estimates. There is only one study – to the best 
of our knowledge – that assessed the determinants of fiscal cyclicality at the general level (i.e. not 
looking specifically at government consumption) using time-varying measures. This paper is by 
Aghion and Marinescu (2008) but they have focused on a subset of advanced economies. However, 
since our dependent variable is based on estimates (and it is measured with different levels of 
precision), we also employ a weighted least squares (WLS) estimator. Specifically, the WLS 
 
10 The approach proposed by Schlicht (2003) is very similar to that used by Aghion and Marinescu (2008). The main 
difference is in the computation of the variances 𝜎௜ଶ. Aghion and Marinescu (2008) uses the Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo method to approximate these variances, while Schlicht (2003) uses a method-of-moments estimator. 
11 We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
12 Similar results are obtained using contemporaneous regressors (not shown). 
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estimator assumes that the errors 𝜉௜,௧ are distributed as 𝜉௜ ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎ଶ/𝑠௜) in which 𝑠௜ is the estimated 
standard deviation of the residuals of the static and time-varying coefficients for each country i, 
and 𝜎ଶ is an unknown parameters that is estimated in the second-stage regression. 
In our vector of explanatory variables, 𝑋௜௧, we consider five key factors: the level of 
development, financial constraints, social fragmentation, the degree of corruption and democratic 
status.  
We include real GDP per capita as a proxy of economic development in line with Talvi and 
Vegh (2005), Thornton (2008) and Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2011). This variable is also 
included to control for potential effects of economic backwardness on fiscal policy and it is 
expected to be negatively correlated with procyclicality.  
In line with Avellan and Vuletin (2015), terms-of-trade can also play a role in affecting the 
degree of fiscal cyclicality. To capture the international trade component, we rely on trade openness 
(defined as the sum of exports and imports over GDP) and the growth rate of each economy´s main 
trading partners. Both variables come from the IMF´s International Financial Statistics.13 
There is also a literature on how cyclicality changes during good and bad times (Manasse, 
2006). Hence, we use a measure of output gap to control for the phase of the business cycle.14 
Several variables have been used as proxies of the stringency of financial constraints.15 
Developing countries typically face credit constraints, a feature that becomes particularly relevant 
during bad times. This fact makes fiscal policy more procyclical (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; and 
Kaminsky et al., 2004). We use as a measure of financial deepening the private credit-to-GDP ratio, 
as a higher level of financial development positively influences the ability of governments to 
borrow during downturns, and therefore it is expected to decrease fiscal procyclicality. In addition, 
most African countries dependent largely on foreign aid. However, budgets in which foreign aid is 
a major financing component may take overall fiscal stance outside the control of the recipient 
country, as a result of the limited predictability of aid disbursements (Pallage and Robe, 2001; Bulir 
and Lane, 2004). 
On social fragmentation, on the one hand, societies characterized by more unequal 
distributions of income are socially more fractionalized and, hence, more susceptible of pursuing 
procyclical fiscal policies. This happens since divergent preferences about the composition of 
government spending between different social actors, makes policymakers spend more on the 
revealed preferences of their key constituencies, contributing to larger overall public expenditure. 
On the other hand, income inequality has also been shown to be negatively correlated with 
government spending, particularly on social programs, which tends to strengthen automatic fiscal 
stabilizers and reduce fiscal procyclicality (Fatas and Mihov, 2001; Pestieau, 2006).  
 
13 We decided not to use directly a terms of trade variable since its coverage for African countries is relatively small 
and would limit the sample size considerably. 
14 The output gap is obtained by filtering with the HP filter the log of real GDP and applying a smoothing parameter 
of 100 as commonly used when employing annual data. 
15 Incomplete markets are also a reason commonly advocated to rationalize procyclical fiscal policy (Riascos and Vegh, 
2003). We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
(continued) 
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Institutional variables comprise of the following. We include a proxy for constrains on the 
executive, following Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Fatas and Mihov (2013), that captures potential 
veto points on the decisions of the executive.16 This variable is likely to reduce spending volatility 
and negatively influence procyclicality. Other political variables are checks and balances and 
regime durability. Indeed, some political economy models suggest that better democracies with 
appropriate checks and balances increase the scope for sounder macroeconomic management 
(including counter-cyclical fiscal policy) by reducing the rents extracted by politicians (Persson et 
al., 1997). Specifically on corruption, according to Alesina and Tabellini (2005) procyclical fiscal 
policy tends to be observed in countries where political corruption is pervasive. However, to other 
authors better governance (lower corruption) per se may do nothing to make fiscal policy less 
counter-cyclical. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Friedman et al. (2000) and Ghura (2002) suggest that 
corruption leads to lower tax revenues and, consequently, to sub-optimal government expenditure.  
We use data on 46 African countries in our analysis and the time period is 1960-2014 but data 
for some countries starts later. We restrict our sample to countries with at least 20 years of 
continuous annual data. The data source for both real GDP and government consumption is the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Summary statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 
A1 in the appendix. Table A2 presents variables´ definitions and sources. 
 
4. Stylized Facts 
3.1 Static Government Consumption Cyclicality Estimates 
Figure 1 shows the histogram for the estimated 𝛽 coefficients from equation (1) for our 
sample of African countries. The average cyclicality coefficient is 0.92, that is, an increase in 
output growth by 1 percentage point increases real government consumption by 0.92 percentage 
points in this group of African countries. The distribution is skewed towards the positive side 
suggesting procyclicality. Note, however, that there is considerable heterogeneity; the standard 
deviation is 1.79. This fact is consistent with other studies, namely Thornton (2008).  
 
  
 
16 Indeed, Tornell and Lane (1999) point to political distortions as a determinant of procyclical fiscal policy. 
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Figure 1. Cyclicality of Government Consumption: Histograms of static 𝜷 
 
Mean = 0.919 ; Sd = 1.796 
Note: histogram drawn using the static version of the government cyclicality coefficients – vide equation (1). 
 
Table 1 shows the country-specific static cyclicality coefficients. In 20 out of 45 cases, we 
find evidence of positive and statistically significant 𝛽 coefficients, suggesting procyclical fiscal 
policies. Particularly high in magnitude (and above unity) are the cases of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Kenya, Madagascar, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In one case, 
Eritrea, we obtain a negative and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that over the last 
20 years fiscal policy in this country has behaved countercyclically.17 All other countries yield 
statistically insignificant 𝛽’s, suggesting acyclicality – which is potentially good news for the 
procyclicality trap (Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin, 2013). Moreover, the coefficient on the lagged level 
of the log of real government consumption comes with the expected negative sign, indicating mean 
reversion in government consumption. The fiscal procyclicality pattern uncovered here is 
consistent with the results found by Woo (2003a,b, 2005) and Thornton (2008) for African 
countries but it contrasts with the much smaller coefficient estimates estimated by Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005) (who specified government spending in percent of GDP). 
 
  
 
17 In contrast, Thornton (2008) found that to be the case of Zimbabwe. 
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Table 1. Cyclicality Coefficients for Government Consumption by country, Static 𝜷 
Country Observations ∆𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝒀𝒕) s.e. 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝑮𝒕ି𝟏) s.e. R-squared 
Algeria 54 1.173*** (0.27) -0.024 (0.036) 0.212 
Angola 34 1.461 (4.689) -0.016 (0.052) 0.025 
Benin 54 1.731** (0.66) -0.119** (0.059) 0.145 
Botswana 54 0.328 (0.36) -0.043 (0.041) 0.16 
Burkina Faso 54 -0.876 (1.028) -0.227** (0.107) 0.118 
Burundi 54 1.056*** (0.307) -0.054 (0.035) 0.203 
Cabo Verde 45 0.461 (0.548) -0.071 (0.093) 0.087 
Cameroon 49 0.219 (0.463) -0.116 (0.082) 0.059 
Central African Republic 54 0.193 (0.208) -0.171** (0.076) 0.105 
Chad 54 0.13 (0.376) -0.128 (0.136) 0.071 
Comoros 51 -0.887 (1.934) -0.259* (0.142) 0.14 
Congo, Democratic Republic 54 10.336*** (2.44) -0.009 (0.022) 0.405 
Congo, Republic 54 1.815*** (0.673) -0.056 (0.045) 0.214 
Cote Ivoire 54 0.799** (0.365) -0.083* (0.048) 0.131 
Equatorial Guinea 49 0.122 (0.323) -0.036 (0.049) 0.019 
Eritrea 22 -1.219* (0.654) -0.523*** (0.178) 0.331 
Ethiopia 51 0.396 (0.643) -0.226** (0.102) 0.126 
Gabon 45 -1.101 (1.293) -0.193** (0.083) 0.124 
Gambia 37 0.296 (0.659) -0.219** (0.093) 0.124 
Ghana 54 1.521 (1.773) -0.094* (0.056) 0.083 
Guinea 45 -1.101 (1.293) -0.193** (0.083) 0.124 
Guinea Bissau 44 0.619 (0.511) -0.103 (0.095) 0.095 
Kenya 54 2.157*** (0.671) -0.117*** (0.037) 0.306 
Lesotho 54 0.141 (0.326) -0.142* (0.078) 0.094 
Liberia 38 1.044*** (0.241) -0.038 (0.034) 0.193 
Madagascar 54 2.310*** (0.493) -0.014 (0.036) 0.238 
Malawi 54 0.113 (0.815) -0.054* (0.032) 0.13 
Mali 51 0.907** (0.419) -0.126 (0.081) 0.107 
Mauritius 38 1.073** (0.476) -0.092 (0.12) 0.168 
Morocco 49 0.508 (0.413) -0.092 (0.064) 0.17 
Mozambique 34 -2.673 (3.023) -0.072 (0.119) 0.196 
Namibia 34 2.051** (0.925) -0.152 (0.142) 0.186 
Niger 52 0.902* (0.49) -0.166* (0.083) 0.16 
Nigeria 45 0.546 (0.452) -0.004 (0.053) 0.08 
Rwanda 54 0.920** (0.432) -0.051 (0.056) 0.162 
Senegal 45 0.576 (0.868) -0.092 (0.063) 0.06 
Seychelles 38 1.359*** (0.479) -0.043 (0.044) 0.351 
Sierra Leone 50 2.369*** (0.519) -0.059* (0.033) 0.27 
South Africa 54 1.402* (0.763) -0.059 (0.041) 0.23 
Swaziland 51 0.904 (1.279) -0.286** (0.124) 0.167 
Tanzania 54 1.257 (1.252) -0.05 (0.04) 0.07 
Togo 54 0.042 (0.736) -0.150* (0.081) 0.085 
Tunisia 54 0.704** (0.266) -0.072 (0.061) 0.115 
Uganda 54 0.54 (2.339) -0.038 -0.046) 0.051 
Zambia 54 3.611*** (0.989) -0.027 -0.021) 0.232 
Zimbabwe 54 2.038** (0.803) -0.186 -0.193) 0.458 
Note: Table presents details of the government consumption cyclicality coefficients β and the coefficients of the level of real 
government consumption lagged from estimates of equation (1) for each country in the sample. “s.e.” denotes robust standard errors. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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Key results are summarized in Table 2 which also compares with statistics from Thornton’s 
(2008) paper. Real government consumption is overwhelmingly procyclical in African countries, 
with 𝛽 coming out positive in 19 out of 46 cases and strictly larger than one – that is, with 
government spending responding more than proportionately to output fluctuations - in 18 cases. 
Adding 9 more countries and 10 more years, changes results slightly compared to Thornton’s 
(2008) original findings (e.g. more volatility in cyclicality attributed to adding 10 years of more 
recent data marked also by the Global Financial Crisis), but the main conclusion remains valid. 
 
Table 2. Summary Cyclicality Coefficients 
Statistics New Thornton (2008)  New with Thornton (2008) sample 
Number of countries 46 37  37 
Mean β 0.919 0.913  0.818 
Standard deviation β 1.796 0.398  1.111 
Maximum β -2.673 -0.173  -2.673 
Minimum β 10.336 1.640  3.611 
Number of times β > 1 18 18  14 
Number of times β > 0 40 36  33 
Number of times β < 0 6 1  3 
Note: “new” corresponds to the sample coverage and time span of this paper; “Thornton” corresponds to the sample 
coverage and time span of Thornton (2008) paper; in column 3 we use the same set of countries as in Thornton’s (2008) 
paper extended from 2004 to 2014. 
 
While useful, a focus only on averages (that is, taking a static approach) misses the substantial 
heterogeneity illustrated in the previous set of histograms and, arguably more importantly, the 
temporal dynamics. Moreover, understanding some of the sources of this heterogeneity requires a 
closer look at the country-by-country estimates. We turn to these aspects in the following (sub-
)sections. 
 
3.2 Dynamic Government Consumption Cyclicality Estimates 
We now allow 𝛽 to be time-varying and run the model described by equations (2) and (3). In 
Figure 2 we plot the interquartile range of the time-varying government spending cyclicality 
coefficients (using balanced samples). The general picture is that the mean cyclicality coefficient 
between 1960 and mid-1990s has remained relatively stable and only then started to increase. The 
Global Financial Crisis in 2008 seems to have reduced the degree of pro-cyclicality in this group 
of countries in the years that followed. In addition, we see a small increase in the dispersion in 
cyclicality coefficients from the early/mid 2000s (observed by the widening of the distance 
between the top and bottom quartiles of the distribution). 
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Figure 2. Interquartile Range of Time-Varying Government Consumption Cyclicality 
Panel A: 1960-2014 Panel B: 1980-2014 
  
Note: Figure displays the inter-quartile time profile of the TVC cyclicality coefficient estimates on balanced samples. 
Panel A) includes African economies with at least 54 observations; panel B) contains African countries with at least 24 
observations.   
 
The individual time-varying country patterns are displayed in Figure A1. While each country 
has its own particular pattern, one common message is the fact that government spnding cyclicality 
has been far from stable over time. The degree of procyclicality has increased in countries such as 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote Ivoire, 
Madagascar, Senegal, Seychelles, Uganda and Zambia. In contrast, in Botswana, Chad, Lesotho, 
Equatorial Guinea, Tunisia, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa, cyclicality coefficients 
have had a downward trend, that is, fiscal policy has become less procyclical over time. 
A final aspect worth considering before moving on to explore the underlying determinants of 
government spending cyclicality coefficients, is to inspect their behavior around recession periods. 
Recessions are defined as years with negative annual real output growth. Looking at Figure 3, 
cyclicality coefficients in African economies increase in absolute value in the run-up to recessions, 
but they fall immediately after. This is in line with Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2013) prediction: 
that over the last decade (following the Global Financial Crisis) about one third of the developing 
world started escaping the procyclicality trap and began engaging in countercyclical fiscal policy. 
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Figure 3: Behavior of Time Varying Cyclicality Coefficients during Recessions 
 
Note: The figure displays the average TVC government spending cyclicality. “t” denotes the year of the recessions 
measured by negative annual GDP growth. “t-2”, “t-1”, “t+1”, “t+2”, denote 2 or 1 years, prior or after the recession 
year.  
 
5. Explaining Cross-Country Heterogeneity in Africa’s Fiscal Procyclicality  
 
Moving on to the main empirical analysis and beginning with the static version, Tables 2 and 
3 show the results for the simple cross-country multivariate regression based on equation (4) using 
OLS and WLS, respectively. We find that the initial level of per capita GDP is negative but not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the level of development in itself is not a factor explaining 
fiscal procyclicality in African countries. We also get a positive and highly significant relationship 
between net foreign aid and fiscal procyclicality – a finding consistent with that of Pallage and 
Robe (2001), Bulir and Hamann (2003) and Barrett (2001) for a more diverse group of countries 
and Thornton (2008) for Africa. This fact supports the financing constraints view put forward by 
Kaminsky et al. (2004) and Gavin and Perotti (1997). The higher the inflationary pressures, the 
more the government engages in procyclical fiscal policy. Moreover, looking at both Tables 2 and 
3, better governance (reduced corruption) does seem to be statistically relevant in negatively 
impacting the degree of fiscal procyclicality. This finding is not consistent with Thornton’s (2008) 
claim that better governance makes available additional resources for new government spending. 
In fact, our finding is in line with the conclusions reported by Alesina and Tabellini (2005). 
Furthermore, results also show a positive and seldomly significant relationship between income 
distribution (social fragmentation) and fiscal procyclicality which contrasts with the hypothesis 
that inequality promotes spending. This is in line with the conclusions by Woo (2003a,b, 2005) for 
a larger panel of developed and developing countries.18 Finally, we get a positive and weakly 
significant (i.e., at the 10 percent significance level) relation between democracy and 
procyclicality, suggesting that increased democracy deteriorates fiscal management which is 
 
18 Since the Gini index limits the total number of observations, in specifications 7-10 we drop this variable to 
maximize our degrees of freedom. We confirm that previous findings are robust. 
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similar to the findings of Alesina and Tabellini (2005). With respect to the interaction between the 
control of corruption and democracy, we obtain a statistically insignificant coefficient throughout 
the different specifications. 
 
Table 3. OLS regression of government consumption cyclicality static coefficients on main 
determinants 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Real GDP per capita -0.094 -0.094 -0.602 -0.170 -0.048 0.421 -0.071 -0.095 -0.321 0.001 
 (0.436) (0.469) (0.429) (0.429) (0.241) (0.661) (0.398) (0.433) (0.387) (0.368) 
Aid 0.108** 0.108** 0.086* 0.115*** 0.047* 0.134**     
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.024) (0.060)     
Gini Index 6.526 6.524 3.917 9.626* 2.603 6.325 1.637 1.644 1.098 2.671 
 (6.034) (6.178) (6.549) (5.162) (3.377) (6.980) (4.402) (4.459) (4.530) (4.236) 
Democracy  0.229 0.229 0.020  0.169 0.270 0.256 0.255 0.069  
 (0.230) (0.235) (0.238)  (0.128) (0.279) (0.170) (0.172) (0.142)  
Control for corruption -2.182** -2.186*  -1.891** -0.785 -2.231* -1.335* -1.419  -0.675 
 (0.842) (1.117)  (0.789) (0.500) (1.083) (0.709) (0.910)  (0.578) 
democ*contcorrup  0.002      0.038   
  (0.319)      (0.253)   
Inflation      0.114***      
     (0.015)      
Private Credit      -5.341     
      (4.922)     
           
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 25 44 44 44 45 
R-squared 0.354 0.354 0.187 0.329 0.810 0.421 0.102 0.103 0.021 0.041 
Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 4. WLS regression of government consumption cyclicality static coefficients on main 
determinants 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Real GDP per capita 0.007 0.147 -0.269 -0.099 0.046 0.231 -0.008 0.131 -0.120 0.012 
 (0.296) (0.312) (0.268) (0.297) (0.213) (0.448) (0.256) (0.272) (0.229) (0.233) 
Aid 0.064* 0.060* 0.051 0.068** 0.040* 0.067     
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.047)     
Gini Index 0.892 1.719 -0.496 4.500 -0.557 -0.180 -1.000 -0.398 -1.208 -0.210 
 (4.267) (4.263) (4.391) (3.718) (3.081) (4.807) (2.639) (2.643) (2.629) (2.543) 
Democracy  0.257 0.265* 0.132  0.222* 0.264 0.145 0.165 0.085  
 (0.161) (0.159) (0.153)  (0.116) (0.198) (0.103) (0.102) (0.083)  
Control for corruption -1.051* -0.522  -0.678 -0.678 -1.108 -0.428 -0.041  -0.059 
 (0.562) (0.691)  (0.526) (0.411) (0.741) (0.435) (0.512)  (0.352) 
democ*contcorrup  -0.260      -0.206   
  (0.202)      (0.148)   
Inflation      0.119***      
     (0.024)      
Private Credit      -1.333     
      (3.668)     
           
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 25 44 44 44 45 
R-squared 0.236 0.284 0.134 0.162 0.621 0.263 0.052 0.098 0.029 0.001 
Note: Weighted Least Squares regression where the weights are given by the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
estimated static Okun coefficients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  *, **, *** denote statistical significant at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Turning to the dynamic (panel) analysis, similarly to Tables 2 and 3, Tables 4 and 5 show the 
results for pooled cross-country regressions based on equation (4) using OLS and WLS, 
respectively. As in the static case, we find that, more developed African economies tend to have a 
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smaller degree of government consumption procyclicality. Talvi and Vegh (2005) and Mpatswe et 
al. (2011) predict that, as nations become richer, their fiscal policies become more stabilizing (or 
counter-cyclical). Aid keeps its positive sign but losses statistical significance. With the panel 
dimension, we do find the strong association between social fragmentation and fiscal procyclicality 
found by Woo (2003a,b, 2005). International trade proxies come out statistically not different from 
zero, while the output gap is positive and highly significant suggesting that procyclicality increases 
during periods of positive output gap – in line with e.g. Granado et al. (2013). Looking at the 
political economy and institutional variables, we find that constraints on the executive are robustly 
negatively and significantly associated with government consumption procyclicality.19 These 
results are consistent with the evidence provided in Fatas and Mihov (2013) and Lane (2003), who 
find that more constraints on the executive tend to reduce government spending volatility and 
positively influence the overall role of fiscal policy stabilization. Regime durability seems to be 
positively correlated with government consumption procyclicality. The presence of budget balance 
rules seems to reduce the degree of procyclicality in African countries (while debt rules have the 
opposite effect).20 
 
Table 5. Country and Time Effects OLS regression of government consumption cyclicality 
time-varying coefficients on main determinants 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Real GDP per capita (t-1) -0.089 -0.071 -0.052 -0.061 -0.851*** -0.122 -0.075 -1.048*** -0.001 -0.096 -0.023 
 (0.233) (0.259) (0.253) (0.238) (0.189) (0.222) (0.230) (0.276) (0.224) (0.233) (0.233) 
Aid (t-1) 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.009    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)    
Output Gap (t-1) 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Gini Index (t-1) 3.867*** 3.603*** 3.971*** 3.880*** 3.911*** 3.159*** 3.151*** 3.539*** 3.142*** 3.729*** 3.627*** 
 (1.452) (1.551) (1.548) (1.453) (1.087) (1.333) (1.451) (1.499) (1.311) (1.445) (1.434) 
Growth of Main Trading 
Partners (t-1) 
 -0.020          
  (0.036)          
Democracy 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.020 -0.004  0.008 -0.008   0.020 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014)  (0.015) (0.015)   (0.016) 
Control for corruption -0.192* -0.174* -0.219** -0.229*  -0.146 -0.209** 0.043 -0.206** -0.202** -0.179* 
 (0.099) (0.108) (0.104) (0.117)  (0.093) (0.098) (0.109) (0.093) (0.100) (0.097) 
Trade Openness (t-1)   -0.037         
   (0.153)         
democ*contcorrup    0.014        
    (0.024)        
Inflation (t-1)       0.066***     
       (0.021)     
Private Credit (t-1)        0.023    
        (0.622)    
Regime durability (t-1)         0.012***   
         (0.004)   
Executive constraints (t-
1) 
         -0.221***  
          (0.029)  
debt_rule           0.273* 
           (0.155) 
expenditure_rule           -0.164 
           (0.191) 
revenue_rule           -0.406 
           (0.427) 
 
19 Results for checks and balances yielded positive and insignificant coefficients and were omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. Democracy without fixed effects yielded positive and significant coefficients. Adding fixed effects 
removes the statistical significance. 
20 Fiscal space might help explain the fiscal reaction of cyclicality to the business cycle as countries with higher public 
debt will be bound to act procyclicality. Adding lagged public debt as a regressor in the different specifications in 
Table 5 indeed reveals a positive coefficient estimate; however, it is not statistically different from zero (results 
available upon request). We thank an anonymous referee for this comment. 
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budget_balance_rule           -0.247*** 
           (0.021) 
            
Observations 411 368 385 411 660 436 411 307 436 411 411 
R-squared 0.932 0.931 0.930 0.932 0.864 0.935 0.934 0.952 0.937 0.932 0.936 
Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Country and time effects estimated 
but omitted for reasons of parsimony. See equation 4 and main text for further details. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
In Table 6 we redo the previous estimations with WLS instead. Results in column (4) of Table 
6 show that when the two variables are interacted, a reduction in corruption promotes counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, and increased democracy dampens it, and the interaction variable is negative 
and statistically significant. This is yet another similarity with respect to Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005). In their paper, when the two variables are interacted, the interaction term comes out 
negative and significant, suggesting that the effect of corruption on procyclicality is particularly 
apparent in democracies. 
 
Table 6. Country and Time Effects WLS regression of government consumption cyclicality 
time-varying coefficients on main determinants 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Real GDP per capita (t-1) -0.109 -0.125 -0.161 -0.079 -0.270** -0.067 -0.094 -0.341* -0.155 -0.107 -0.208 
 (0.164) (0.183) (0.178) (0.167) (0.129) (0.154) (0.163) (0.185) (0.159) (0.163) (0.170) 
Aid (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005    
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)    
Output Gap (t-1) 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.010** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Gini Index (t-1) 4.856*** 4.719*** 5.044*** 4.911*** 2.692*** 5.182*** 4.654*** 8.909*** 5.339*** 4.806*** 5.084*** 
 (1.179) (1.269) (1.266) (1.182) (0.746) (1.058) (1.176) (1.247) (1.048) (1.179) (1.173) 
Growth of Main Trading 
Partners (t-1) 
 -0.003          
  (0.027)          
Democracy 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.001  0.007 0.004   0.009 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009)  (0.010) (0.010)   (0.012) 
Control for corruption -0.118* -0.117* -0.149** -0.086  -0.091 -0.122* -0.061 -0.113* -0.124* -0.110* 
 (0.065) (0.072) (0.070) (0.076)  (0.060) (0.065) (0.070) (0.061) (0.066) (0.066) 
Trade Openness (t-1)   -0.152         
   (0.136)         
democ*contcorrup    -0.016*        
    (0.009)        
Inflation (t-1)       0.038**     
       (0.017)     
Private Credit (t-1)        -0.035    
        (0.374)    
Regime durability (t-1)         0.006**   
         (0.003)   
Executive constraints (t-
1) 
         0.016  
          (0.019)  
debt_rule           0.181* 
           (0.101) 
expenditure_rule           -0.037 
           (0.120) 
revenue_rule           -0.245 
           (0.412) 
budget_balance_rule           -0.065 
           (0.138) 
            
Observations 411 368 385 411 660 436 411 307 436 411 411 
R-squared 0.913 0.908 0.913 0.913 0.866 0.915 0.914 0.933 0.916 0.913 0.916 
Note: Weighted Least Squares regression, where the weights are given by the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
estimated time-varying cyclicality coefficients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. See equation 4 and main text for 
further details. Country and time effects estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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In Table 7 we take the most representative specifications of Table 6 (namely 1-4) and run, by 
WLS, regressions before and after 2000.21 Interestingly, the relevance of some procyclicality 
determinants matter more in the older period (e.g. aid and institutional proxies), while for others 
their strength materializes in the most recent period (output gap and income distribution). All in 
all, most signs and effects are consistent with previous evidence when the sample is not split. 
 
Table 7. WLS regression of government consumption cyclicality time-varying coefficients 
on main determinants: pre and post-2000 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimator  Pre-2000 Post-2000 
Real GDP per capita (t-1) -1.045** -1.530*** -1.392*** -0.355 0.182 0.175 -0.638*** -0.564*** 
 (0.508) (0.534) (0.316) (0.298) (0.251) (0.253) (0.242) (0.230) 
Aid (t-1) 0.008 0.013** 0.027*** 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Gini Index (t-1) 2.118 2.501 6.706*** 0.986 10.697*** 10.669*** 10.381*** 11.220*** 
 (3.178) (3.073) (2.106) (3.026) (1.648) (1.653) (1.603) (1.536) 
Output Gap (t-1) 0.007 0.008 0.015** 0.006 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Democracy  -0.001 0.048 0.035*  0.010 0.015 0.010  
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.025) (0.017)  
Control for corruption -0.039 -0.229*  -0.002 0.089 0.063  0.099 
 (0.110) (0.135)  (0.097) (0.107) (0.138)  (0.102) 
democ*contcorrup  0.059**    0.007   
  (0.026)    (0.025)   
         
Observations 93 93 342 99 318 318 318 337 
R-squared 0.989 0.990 0.883 0.989 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.969 
Note: Weighted Least Squares regressions, where the weights are given by the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
estimated time-varying cyclicality coefficients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. See equation 4 and main text for 
further details. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Finally, in Table A3 in the appendix we checked if our results were robust to outliers. A closer 
inspection of the data could hint that influential outliers could play a role. The sample sensitivity 
of cross-country empirical studies is well known. Therefore, one advance in this paper over earlier 
work is the use of two robust estimators, the Method of Moments (MM) and the Least Absolute 
Deviation (LAD). The former fits the efficient high breakdown estimator proposed by Yohai (1987) 
which on the first stage takes the S estimator applied to the residual scale and derives starting values 
for the coefficient vectors, and on the second stage applies the Huber-type bisquare M-estimator 
using iteratively re-weighted least squares to obtain the final coefficient estimates. As for the LAD, 
it minimizes the sum of the absolute deviations. We then exclude any observations for which the 
LAD residual is more than two standard deviations from the mean residual, before re-estimating 
the model by OLS or FE. When the two sets of estimates are very different, then it may be that the 
observations are drawn from several different regimes, and/or the OLS (FE) estimates are driven 
by a few outliers. These procedures are not perfect, but should help to exclude the worst outliers, 
including some that would not be identified by more conventional OLS (FE) diagnostics. As one 
 
21 The choice of 2000 was ad-hoc. Splitting alternatively half-way would result in too few observations in the first 
half of the sample (due to the limited coverage far back in time of the Gini index). 
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can observe, results remain qualitatively unchanged, hence, our findings are not driven by 
particular outliers. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Fiscal policy can influence medium-term growth through its support to macroeconomic 
stability. Most research on fiscal policy cyclicality has, for a long time, focused on advanced 
economies due to data availability and data quality reasons. In this paper, we focused on a sample 
of 46 African countries between 1960 and2014 and explored, using a novel empirical strategy, the 
degree of cyclicality of government consumption. Using time-varying estimates of government 
consumption cyclicality, we provided a characterization of its behavior across countries and over 
time and then inspected its main macroeconomic and institutional determinants.  
We found that government consumption has been, on average, highly procyclical in African 
countries. This is likely to have amplified GDP fluctuations and weakened development efforts in 
several countries. However, sample averages hide high degrees of heterogeneity in government 
consumption cyclicality between countries. The great majority of African countries in our sample 
displayed procyclical spending behavior, with government consumption responding more than 
proportionately to fluctuations in output in many cases. However, as Frankel et al. (2013) alluded 
to, some countries seem to be graduating away from procyclicality into acyclicality or even 
counter-cyclicality (e.g. Eritrea). Moreover, results presented in this paper suggest that several 
macroeconomic policies as well as institutional and political characteristics can affect the degree 
of government spending cyclicality. First, more developed African economies tend to have a 
smaller degree of government consumption procyclicality. Also, countries with higher social 
fragmentation and those more reliant on foreign aid inflows tend to have a more procyclical 
spending policy. Looking at the political economy and institutional variables, we find that 
constraints on the executive and regime durability are robustly negatively and significantly 
associated with government consumption procyclicality. Better governance promotes counter-
cyclical fiscal policy while increased democracy dampens it. Finally, some fiscal rules seem to be 
important in curbing the procyclical behavior of government spending.  
Future research on the topic could consider looking at the consequences of procyclical 
government fiscal policy for macroeconomic volatility and long-term growth. Also, it would be 
interesting to properly disentangle the automatic fiscal response to the cycle from the discretionary 
fiscal policy reaction. Finally, yet another avenue of future work could be the exploration of 
revenues´ cyclicality – being these the natural budget counterpart to government expenditures.22 
 
 
 
22 At the cost of exploring these issues insufficiently, partially or in a limited way due to space constraints, we 
decided to leave them for another, separate, research project. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A1. Time-Varying Government Consumption Cyclicality, by country 
 
Note: the red line denotes the TVC cyclicality coefficient, while the black one denotes the average.  
Source: authors’ calculations
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Table A1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Observations  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
GDP per capita (log) 2323 7.134 0.905 5.080 10.381 
GDP deflator 2488 65.454 86.103 2.81e-14 795.75 
Real government consumption  2310 0.929 4.446 -0.4870 32.770 
Private Credit  1449 0.187 0.156 2.30e-7 1.007 
Democracy   2115 2.228 3.132 0 10 
Foreign aid 1718 186.50 17.209 92.103 224.32 
Gini index  1004 0.419 0.075 0.276 0.611 
Executive constraints 1692 3.026 1.914 1 7 
Checks and balances 1631 1.826 1.075 1 6 
Regime durability  2225 12.06 14.88 0 105 
Expenditure rule 2640 0.004 0.070 0 1 
Revenue rule 2640 0.006 0.077 0 1 
Debt rule 2640 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Budget balance rule 2640 0.085 0.028 0 1 
Note: summary statistics computed over the sample for which the time-varying Okun coefficients were 
computed. 
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Table A2. Variables’ Definitions and Sources 
Variables Definition Source 
GDP per 
capita  
Real gross domestic product divided by 
population 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
GDP deflator Price Deflator of GDP IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Real 
government 
consumption 
(log)  
Nominal government consumption expenditure 
deflated with GDP deflator 
IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Private credit   Domestic credit to private sector refers to 
financial resources provided to the private sector 
by financial institutions  
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Democracy   Democracy score (DEMOC2) measures the 
general openness of political institutions. 
Polity IV Project 
Foreign aid 
(log) 
Net official development assistance and official 
aid received 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Gini index  Gin index on disposable income (0-1 scale) Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
Executive 
constraints 
This variable refers to the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives, whether 
individuals or collectivities. 
Polity IV Project 
Checks and 
balances 
Checks and balances Database of Political Institutions 2015 
Regime 
durability  
Number of years since the most recent regime 
change 
Polity IV Project 
Expenditure 
rule 
Takes the value 1 when an expenditure rule is in 
place 
IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm 
Revenue rule Takes the value 1 when a revenue-based rule is 
in place 
IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm 
Debt rule Takes the value 1 when a debt rule is in place IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm 
Budget 
balance rule 
Takes the value 1 when a budget balance rule is 
in place 
IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm 
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Table A3. Outlier Robust regressions of government consumption cyclicality time-
varying coefficients on main determinants  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimator  LAD MM 
Real GDP per capita (t-1) -0.089 -0.129** -0.055 -0.006 -0.128* 0.197*** -0.157*** -0.078 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.050) (0.064) (0.068) (0.061) (0.043) (0.051) 
Aid (t-1) 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.011** 0.016*** 0.007* 0.011*** -0.009*** 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Gini Index (t-1) 0.764 1.259* -0.045 1.718** 1.920*** 2.738*** 0.772 2.196*** 
 (0.656) (0.674) (0.643) (0.713) (0.627) (0.499) (0.574) (0.688) 
Democracy  0.120*** 0.094*** 0.103***  0.062*** 0.034*** 0.039**  
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)  
Control for corruption -0.465*** -0.219  -0.193* -0.502*** -0.228*  -0.427*** 
 (0.109) (0.140)  (0.115) (0.188) (0.130)  (0.128) 
democ*contcorrup  -0.067***    -0.087***   
  (0.024)    (0.021)   
         
Observations 358 358 358 358 411 411 660 436 
R-squared 0.209 0.226 0.168 0.037     
Note: Least Absolute Deviation and MM estimators as identified in the second row (see main text for details). 
Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
